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Resource Intensive Production and Aggregate Economic Performance: Evidence
from Canada’s Energy, Fishing, Forestry, and Mining Industries, 1970-2005
The main objective of this paper is to determine whether specialization in resource intensive pro-
duction had a positive impact on the performance of the aggregate Canadian economy over the
1970-2005 period. Specialization is simply measured as the proportion of aggregate employment,
the aggregate ﬁxed capital stock, and G.N.P. that may be attributed to Canada’s energy, ﬁshing,
forestry, and mining industries. Direct contributions to intensive, or per capita performance are
measured in terms of the resource industries’ proﬁtability, productivity, and capital intensity. Indi-
rect contributions to economic performance are measured in terms of spill overs, or linkages to other
non-resource intensive industries through raw material price advantages and demand generation.
The possibility that resource intensive production may have been crowding out other sectors in the
economy through input price inﬂation or currency appreciation is also investigated. Based on the
evidence, I argue that Canada’s resource industries were making a substantial positive impact on
aggregate economic performance after 1970, but this conclusion depends on the inclusion of the
energy industries in resource sector.
Keywords: Resource dependence, spill overs, crowding out, economic growth and development.1 Introduction
The main policy question motivating the empirical investigation described in this paper concerns
the desirability of promoting specialization in resource intensive production in Canada. Uncertainty
regarding the extent to which it would be advantageous for the Canadian economy, in aggregate
at least, to become increasingly specialized in resource extraction and processing activities is ap-
parent in recent policy discussions and media coverage related to a wide range of government
activity, including monetary policy and currency valuation, environmental regulation, taxation,
inter-provincial migration, and industrial policy.1 This uncertainty stems from not only the inher-
ent problems associated with the estimation of future rates of resource discovery and depletion, but
also from regional economic and policy diversity, and from conﬂicting theoretical predictions and
empirical evidence.
To most Canadians who reside outside of southern Ontario, south-western Quebec, and possi-
bly the lower mainland in British Columbia, it must seem quite unnecessary to seriously question
the extent to which resource extraction and processing activities positively aﬀect aggregate eco-
nomic performance. Certainly, with respect to our understanding of Canadian performance in the
long run, there has been a particularly rich and persistent vein of research that has emphasized
the fundamental importance of resource exploitation for both intensive and extensive growth.2
However, in a contemporary context it may not be totally self-evident that encouraging greater
resource dependence is necessarily in the best interests of the aggregate economy, or the majority
of Canadians. To those who reside within Canada’s densely populated urban and industrial re-
gions, questions about the desirability of continued and/or increased resource dependence may also
seem unnecessary, but the assumed answer to these questions would likely be quite diﬀerent from
that proposed throughout the rest of the country. In addition, there are at least three strands of
literature - the Dutch disease/resource curse literature, the new economy literature, and literature
on twentieth century Canadian industrial development - that either implicitly or, in many cases,
explicitly suggests that resource exploitation in Canada has not had a substantive positive impact
on economic performance since the early 1900s.3
1To illustrate some of the many, many examples available from media coverage of federal and provincial policy
issues that may be aﬀected by our understanding of the impact of resource dependence within the Canadian economy
see The Globe and Mail (March 11, 2008) Pg. B14: “Trade Figures Inﬂuence Loonie’s Fate”, (March 11, 2008) Pg.
B8: “Irving Wants Cheap Power Environmentalist Says”, (March 8, 2008) Pg. A4: “P.M.’s Message for Ontario:
Cut Corporate Taxes, Expect No Bailouts”, or (March 11, 2008) Pg. B1: “Awash in Cash, Oil Patch Braces for
Changes”.
2For example, see Innis (1930) and (1940), Watkins (1963), or Keay (2007).
3For just one illustrative example from each strand of literature see Sachs and Warner (2001) Pg. 832, Nordhaus
1It is not the objective of this paper to make predictions about the economic contributions that
will be made by Canada’s resource industries in the future. Instead the approach adopted here is
to look to the past in an eﬀort to understand the economic impact that specialization in resource
intensive production has had on the aggregate Canadian economy since 1970. The hope is that an
understanding of the past will help to establish reasonable bounds for the formation of expectations
about the economic impact we might expect to result from future specialization.
As a ﬁrst step in the establishment of these reasonable bounds, we must assess the extent to
which the aggregate Canadian economy was dependent on resource extraction and processing ac-
tivities during the post-1970 period. More speciﬁcally, we must consider the resource industries’
contributions to the size of the domestic economy. Based on a simple growth accounting exer-
cise, we can think of resource specialization in terms of inputs employed and output produced. I
have calculated the share of total employment, the aggregate ﬁxed capital stock, and aggregate
income (G.N.P.) originating in Canada’s energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries for each
year between 1970-2005. The contrast between the resource intensive industries’ shares and more
human capital and technology intensive “new economy” industries’ shares may be used as a useful
benchmark in the assessment of the extent of resource specialization after 1970.
Determining exactly how much the resource industries have contributed to the size of the
Canadian economy cannot tell us much about the impact this specialization has had on performance.
To investigate the impact that resource dependency has had on the aggregate economy it is revealing
to consider the resource industries’ direct contributions to intensive, or per capita performance.
Based on standard macroeconomic growth models we might reasonably expect indicators such as
proﬁtability, productivity, and capital intensity to be quite closely associated with average per capita
income levels. To assess proﬁtability I measure aggregate resource rents, or more speciﬁcally, value
added generated in excess of the opportunity cost of the labour and capital employed by Canada’s
resource producers, as a proportion of G.N.P.. I measure productivity using indicators of relative
total factor productivity (T.F.P.) and relative labour productivity. Capital intensity is measured
as the real value of gross ﬁxed capital per worker.
Resource based development theories, such as the “staples thesis”, tell us that resource extrac-
tion and processing activities may have an impact on aggregate economic performance that extends
beyond their direct contributions to per capita growth. The concentration of labour and capital
into resource intensive production may foster structural diversiﬁcation within an economy through
(2002) Pg. 233, and Easterbrook (1959) Pg. 76, respectively.
2the formation of forward, backward, and ﬁnal demand linkages. The presence of these linkages,
or spill overs, suggests particular chronological patterns among sectoral output levels and raw ma-
terial prices. Reduced form vector auto-regressive (V.A.R.) systems can be used to identify these
chronological patterns. To be more speciﬁc, Granger causality tests may be used to determine the
extent to which Canada’s resource industries still comprised a leading sector in the economy, and
the extent to which forward, backward, and ﬁnal demand linkages may still have been operable,
even after 1970.
There are other development theories, described in the “Dutch disease” and “resource curse” lit-
erature, for example, that are much more pessimistic about the possibility that promoting resource
specialization may be good for the aggregate economy. These theories suggest that the pursuit
of resource rents can draw labour and capital away from more “growth enhancing” activities by
driving up labour and capital costs for the non-resource intensive sectors in the economy. It is also
possible, according to these theories, that foreign demand for resource intensive exports can increase
the demand for the domestic currency on international money markets, which in turn can increase
the cost of imported inputs and reduce the demand for non-resource intensive domestic exports.
Like the staples thesis’ linkages, the damaging crowding out described by the Dutch disease and
resource curse literature suggests particular chronological patterns among sectoral output levels,
input prices, and foreign exchange rates. Again, reduced form vector auto-regressive systems can
be used to identify these chronological patterns.
Based on the evidence described in this paper I suggest that, despite a precipitous decline in
the extent of resource dependency in the aggregate Canadian economy after 1970, characterized by
decreases in employment, capital, and income shares, resource extraction and processing industries
were still making important contributions to aggregate economic performance. Indicators such as
proﬁtability, productivity, and capital intensity remained strong over the 1970-2005 period; resource
producers’ continued to comprise a leading sector in the economy; chronological patterns consistent
with the operation of forward, backward, and ﬁnal demand linkages may be identiﬁed; and; there is
no evidence that resource intensive production was associated with adverse input market conditions
or currency appreciation. There is, however, an important caveat to keep in mind - many of these
conclusions depend critically on the inclusion of the energy extraction industries in the resource
sector. If we consider energy extraction separately from the rest of the resource intensive producers,
then the ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries no longer comprise a leading sector in the economy
after 1970, their input and income contributions fall even more dramatically, and their contributions
3to aggregate performance through their proﬁtability, productivity, and capital intensity are more
stable, but in some cases substantially lower.
In general, therefore, the evidence suggests that since 1970 there have been signiﬁcant positive
economic eﬀects associated with resource specialization in Canada. The persistence of these eﬀects
into the future depends, at least in part, on continued “economic discovery” of resource endowments
that may be proﬁtably exploited, the retention of resource rents within the domestic economy, and
the promotion of linkages from resource extraction and processing activities to other non-resource
intensive industries.
2 Specializing in Resource Extraction and Processing: Input Em-
ployment and Income Generation
Before embarking on any investigation of the contributions Canada’s resource intensive producers
have made to late twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst century aggregate economic performance, we
must ﬁrst identify exactly which producers we wish to include in the resource sector. This task is
more challenging if we wish to identify particular sub-groups within the sector, such as the energy
extraction industries. We are, of course, presented with yet another set of challenges if we also
wish to identify a non-resource intensive performance benchmark, such as the human capital and
technology intensive new economy industries.
Natural resource industries should include those producers that are involved in the extraction
and processing of a nation’s physical resource endowments. We might initially expect that an ob-
vious contrast to these industries would be new economy industries, which should include those
producers whose main production inputs are human capital and technology. The challenges stem
from the fact that any contrast of this sort is largely theoretical, because virtually all late twentieth
century Canadian producers were involved, in some way, in the transformation, preparation, and
processing of natural resource inputs, and virtually all used considerable quantities of both human
capital and technology. This blurring of the line between new economy and resource industries
is even more acute if we allow human capital to be deﬁned as something more than simply years
of formal education, and technology to be deﬁned as something more than information transmis-
sion and processing equipment. Where I use the terms “new economy industries” and “resource
industries” throughout this paper they should be understood to comprise relatively human capital
(formal education) and technology (information transmission and processing) intensive producers,
and relatively resource intensive producers, respectively.
4To identify resource industries I have relied on a recent categorization of extraction, primary
processing, and secondary processing industries involved in energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining
provided by Natural Resources Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.4 To identify
human capital and technology intensive industries I have relied on the classiﬁcation provided by
Robert Gordon (2000) and William Nordhaus (2002 and 2005), who have written a series of papers
which describe the impact that increasing human capital and technology intensity has had on the
aggregate U.S. economy over the past quarter century.5 In these papers a set of broadly deﬁned
U.S. industries have been identiﬁed as “new economy” producers.6 I have tried to match compara-
ble Canadian industries to those speciﬁed by Gordon and Nordhaus.7 Fortunately, the qualitative
conclusions I report in the remainder of this paper are fairly insensitive to most reasonable reorga-
nizations of the industry groups identiﬁed in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1
For each industry group speciﬁed in Figure 1 and for the aggregate Canadian economy I have
compiled annual ﬁgures covering the years 1970-2005 on: employment, real gross ﬁxed capital,
and value added; sector speciﬁc output price indexes, capital cost indexes, raw material price
indexes, and wage indexes; and; the proportion of value added paid to labour (as wages and
salaries) and to capital (calculated as a residual). For each of the four natural resource industries
- energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining - at each of three stages of production - extraction, primary
processing, and secondary processing - my data series span 106 years from 1900-2005, although I
only use information from 1947-2005 in this study.8
To assess the extent to which the Canadian economy was specialized in resource extraction
and processing activities after 1970, I simply wish to identify the resource industries’ contributions
to the size of the aggregate economy. Given the rhetoric that has been disseminated about the
expansion of the new economy, human capital and technology intensive industries seem to be a
natural benchmark for the assessment of both the level of resource dependence in the Canadian
4These industries were identiﬁed on the N.R.Can. and D.F.O. web sites (accessed in April, 2004) at either the
three or four digit N.A.I.C.S. level of aggregation.
5In addition to the U.S.-centric Gordon and Nordhaus papers, Gera and Mang (1998), and Beckstead et al. (2004)
oﬀer a Canadian perspective on the post-1970 ascension of human capital and technology intensive service industries.
6For example, Nordhaus (2005, Tables 6-8) provides a list of new economy industries, and Gordon (2000, Pg. 50)
seems to use computer intensity as an identifying criteria for new economy industries.
7Because the education, health, and social service industries in Canada are part of the public sector, but they are
clearly human capital and technology intensive, I have derived all of my new economy benchmarks with and without
these industries.
8A complete Data Appendix with source citations and detailed compilation, construction, and aggregation tech-
niques is available from the author.
5Table 1: Labour, Capital, and Income Shares
Labour Share
1970-74 2001-05 %∆ ρ
All NR 0.100 0.057 −1.960∗∗∗ 0.209
NR without Energy 0.097 0.055 −1.999∗∗∗ 0.215
All NE 0.180 0.215 0.588∗∗∗ 0.066
Private NE 0.122 0.138 0.340∗∗∗ 0.053
Capital Share
1970-74 2001-05 %∆ ρ
All NR 0.196 0.157 −1.150∗∗∗ 0.194
NR without Energy 0.153 0.105 −1.182∗∗∗ 0.191
All NE 0.325 0.494 1.426∗∗∗ 0.154
Private NE 0.243 0.417 1.825∗∗∗ 0.190
Income Share
1970-74 2001-05 %∆ ρ
All NR 0.158 0.111 −1.393∗∗∗ 0.180
NR without Energy 0.135 0.083 −1.577∗∗∗ 0.190
All NE 0.274 0.349 0.886∗∗∗ 0.104
Private NE 0.173 0.255 1.344∗∗∗ 0.143
Note: All NR includes all the natural resource industries identiﬁed in Figure 1, NR without Energy includes all the
natural resource industries except energy extraction, All NE includes all the new economy industries identiﬁed in
Figure 1, Private NE includes all the new economy industries except education, health, and social services.
Note: ∗ ∗ ∗/∗∗/∗ indicates that the average annual %∆ is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with at least
99% conﬁdence, 95% conﬁdence, 90% conﬁdence, respectively. ρ = coeﬃcient of variation (= σ/µ).
economy, and changes in this dependence after 1970. I have, therefore, calculated the proportion of
the aggregate Canadian workforce, ﬁxed capital stock, and gross national product that originated in
each of four industry groups - all natural resource industries, natural resource industries excluding
energy extraction, all new economy industries, and private new economy industries (excluding the
public sector industries - education, health, and social services) - for each year between 1970-2005.
In Table 1 I report the mean level of the labour, capital, and income shares for the resource and
new economy industry groups averaged over the years 1970-1974 and 2001-2005, the average annual
percentage change in these shares over the 36 years following 1970, and the post-1970 coeﬃcients
of variation for each series.
From Table 1 we can see that the natural resource industries’ contributions to aggregate size of
the Canadian economy fell very rapidly after 1970. Canada’s energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining
producers were sheading workers particularly quickly, reducing their share of total employment
from 10% of the aggregate workforce at the beginning of the period, to less than 6% by the end of
the period - an average annual rate of decline of nearly 2% per year. In addition, their investment
rates were lower than the aggregate economy, leading to a reduction in their share of aggregate ﬁxed
6capital by 1.15% per year between 1970-2005. Income shares also fell, at an average annual rate of
1.39%, resulting in a reduction in the proportion of G.N.P. originating in the resource industries
from almost 16% immediately after 1970 to just over 11% by 2001-2005. If we remove energy
extraction from the resource producers’ input and income shares, the erosion in their post-1970
contributions is even more precipitous. The ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries’ employment
shares dropped by 2% per year, capital shares by 1.18% per year, and income shares by 1.58% per
year.
The contrast between the contributions made by the resource intensive producers, particularly
the ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries, and the human capital and technology intensive pro-
ducers is striking. We can see that in 1970-1974 the new economy industries were not even twice
the size of the resource industries in terms of employment, capital, or income. If we consider only
the private sector new economy industries, the initial diﬀerences in input and income contributions
were very small indeed - less than 10% for all three indicators. By 2001-2005 the new economy
industries employed nearly four times as many workers, they housed more than three times as much
capital, and they generated more than three times as much income. These level diﬀerences at the
end of the period are almost as large even if we do not include the public sector new economy in-
dustries. The diﬀerences in average annual growth rates reﬂect these changes in the groups’ relative
shares, with the new economy industries increasing their contributions to employment by 0.59%
per year, on average, capital stock by 1.43% per year, and G.N.P. by 0.89%. The private sector new
economy industries increased their capital and income shares even faster than the human capital
and technology intensive industries as a whole - by 1.83% and 1.34% per year, respectively.
Although we must keep in mind that even at the very end of the period considered in this paper
the resource industries were still employing a fairly large proportion of the aggregate labour force
and capital stock, and they were still generating more than one out of every 10 dollars earned in
Canada, the divergent trends in the input and income contributions certainly paint a fairly grim
picture of the resource industries’ post-1970 role in the Canadian economy (even if we include
energy extraction). One can easily see how, at least at ﬁrst glance, the ﬁgures in Table 1 seem
consistent with a dramatic shift in economic specialization away from activities that were dependent
on Canada’s resource endowments, towards those that were dependent on Canada’s human capital
and technology endowments. However, there are a number of subtleties we may wish to consider
with respect to this rather pessimistic (at least from the resource industries’ perspective) conclusion.
In particular, the post-1970 summary statistics reported in Table 1 may be only part of the story.
7A more complete picture of resource dependence in the Canadian economy may emerge from the
adoption of a longer run perspective and an investigation of other economic contributions.
2.1 A Longer Run Perspective
In February 1947 Imperial Oil’s Number 1 well in Leduc, Alberta struck oil. The discovery of sub-
stantial reserves of petroleum that could be proﬁtably exploited marked an economic, technological,
and public policy transition in the Canadian economy, away from a dependence on traditional ﬁsh,
timber, and mineral resources, towards energy. The early 1970s are, of course, also typically viewed
as a period of transition in the resource dependence of the Canadian economy. To place this more
recent transition into its appropriate context it seems reasonable to devote some attention to the
resource industries’ input and income contributions that preceded 1970, and to extend our focus
beyond linear trends and average annual rates of change.
In Figures 2-4 the share of total employment, aggregate ﬁxed capital, and G.N.P. for all energy,
ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries are depicted for the years 1947-2005. These ﬁgures also
illustrate the resource industries’ input and income shares with the energy extraction industries
removed. To emphasize the longer run cyclical movements in these shares each series has been
decomposed into its stationary and non-stationary components using a Hoddrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
The non-stationary, or smoothed components are included in the ﬁgures.
Insert Figures 2-4
Although one could tell very detailed region and industry speciﬁc stories about the chronological
patterns that can be observed in Figures 2-4, I wish to focus on just three main points related
to the extent of resource dependency in the aggregate Canadian economy. First, the post-1970
contractions in the resource industries’ input and income contributions do not appear to have been
chronologically coincident with any post-1970 structural changes in the economy. The resource
industries’ employment and G.N.P. shares, for example, were falling throughout the 1947-2005
period, and the erosion of these shares seems to have actually slowed over the last 10-15 years of
the sample. The resource industries’ contributions to the aggregate stock of ﬁxed capital were in
decline from at least the mid-1950s. These longer run patterns suggest that the contractions in
domestic resource specialization that may be identiﬁed from the summary statistics reported in
Table 1 were not triggered by the recent rise of the human capital and technology intensive new
economy industries.
8A second point that becomes even more striking after considering the series illustrated in Figures
2-4 is the increasing importance of energy extraction activities starting in the late 1960s. Although
this increasing importance is not obvious in the resource producers’ employment shares (which is
interesting in its own right), if we consider the capital shares and income shares, the gap between
the resource industries with and without energy extraction widens substantially over the last half
of the 1947-2005 period.
The third point I wish to emphasize is again associated with the role played by energy extraction
industries. If we consider the ﬁltered series depicted in Figures 3 and 4 (leaving aside the employ-
ment shares which are remarkably similar with or without energy) it becomes clear that energy
extraction adds a considerable amount of cyclical volatility to the resource industries’ capital and
income contributions. This additional volatility is not apparent from the post-1970 the coeﬃcients
of variation reported in Table 1, but over the longer run the energy booms beginning in the early
1970s and early 1990s, and the energy bust beginning the early 1980s can be clearly identiﬁed in
these ﬁgures.
Based on the longer run chronological patterns we can observe in these ﬁgures it appears,
therefore, that changes in the resource dependence of the aggregate economy were not coincident
with any structural changes driven by an increasingly intensive use of human capital and technology.
The longer run perspective also highlights the unique contributions made by energy extraction
industries, particularly since the late 1960s. The substantial increases in both the size of the
energy producers’ contributions to extensive performance and the volatility in these contributions,
appears much more obvious when one considers the full 1947-2005 period. Although the Canadian
economy may not have been becoming increasingly resource dependent after 1970, it was clearly
becoming increasingly energy dependent.
3 Contributions to Intensive Performance: Proﬁtability, Produc-
tivity, and Capital Intensity
Even though the proportion of aggregate employment, the ﬁxed capital stock, and G.N.P. origi-
nating in Canada’s ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries was falling after 1970, and the energy
industries input and income shares, while increasing rapidly on average, were highly volatile, the
absolute size of these industries should lead us to safely accept their continued importance in the
aggregate economy. Of course, just because Canada’s resource industries remain a large part of the
9domestic economy, this does not necessarily mean that resource specialization has been advanta-
geous. If we are interested in standards of living and economic development, rather than simply
the absolute size of an economy, then it seems reasonable to turn our attention to the resource
industries’ contributions to per capita or intensive economic performance.
Even the most basic macroeconomic growth models emphasize the positive relationship between
income per capita, on one hand, and returns to labour and capital in excess of their opportunity
costs, technological change, eﬃciency gains, and capital accumulation, on the other.9 Therefore, if
we accept the guidance provided by these models, then we may assess the contributions made by
Canada’s resource industries to intensive economic performance by considering their proﬁtability,
productivity, and capital intensity. For each year between 1970-2005 I have calculated the resource
industries’ (with and without energy extraction) aggregate resource rents (or economic proﬁts)
relative to G.N.P., and their total factor productivity, labour productivity, and capital-labour
ratios relative to the aggregate economy.
Total resource rents have been measured as the value added generated by the energy, ﬁshing,
forestry, and mining industries in excess of the opportunity cost of their labour and capital, plus
all resource royalties, licences, and fees paid to government:
Rt = (V At + Tt) − (WL∗
t×Lt) − (WK∗
t ×Kt) (1)
Where: the opportunity cost of the resource industries’ labour (WL∗) is assumed to be the average
return to labour in non-resource intensive manufacturing10, and the opportunity cost of their capital
(WK∗) is assumed to be the average return on Moody’s AAA industrial bonds. The resource
industries’ T.F.P. performance has been assessed relative to the aggregate Canadian economy using
a Tornqvist geometric weighted average of relative labour and capital productivity, with value added












Where: the resource industries are indexed by i and the aggregate Canadian economy is indexed
by j, and the elasticity of labour and capital with respect to output (SL and SK) are assumed to
9For a text book illustration of the theoretical connections among these variables see Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) Pg. 28-33 and 66-68.
10Non-resource intensive manufacturing is total manufacturing less the primary and secondary resource processing
industries that may be categorized as “manufacturing”.
11For a more detailed discussion of the Tornqvist index number approach to T.F.P. measurement see Allen and
Diewert (1981).
10Table 2: Proﬁtability, Productivity, and Capital Intensity
Rent Share
1970-74 2001-05 %∆ ρ
All NR 0.089 0.113 0.233 0.227
NR without Energy 0.068 0.082 0.633 0.342
TFP Ratio
1970-74 2001-05 %∆ ρ
All NR 1.567 1.457 −0.297∗∗ 0.088
NR without Energy 1.354 1.316 -0.247 0.108
Q/L Ratio
1970-74 2001-05 %∆ ρ
All NR 2.155 2.555 0.220 0.087
NR without Energy 1.700 1.891 0.233∗ 0.086
K/L Ratio
1970-74 2001-05 %∆ ρ
All NR 1.970 2.767 0.605∗∗ 0.158
NR without Energy 1.578 1.914 0.691∗∗∗ 0.149
Note: All NR includes all the natural resource industries identiﬁed in Figure 1, NR without Energy includes all the
natural resource industries except energy extraction.
Note: ∗ ∗ ∗/∗∗/∗ indicates that the average annual %∆ is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with at least
99% conﬁdence, 95% conﬁdence, 90% conﬁdence, respectively. ρ = coeﬃcient of variation (= σ/µ).
be cost shares that sum to one. The labour productivity performance of the resource industries has
been assessed relative to the aggregate Canadian economy using value added, deﬂated by a sector
speciﬁc output price index, divided by total employment. The capital intensity of the resource
industries has been assessed relative to the aggregate Canadian economy using the ratio of real
gross ﬁxed capital divided by total employment.
In Table 2 I report the mean rent shares, T.F.P. ratios, labour productivity ratios, and capital-
labour ratios for all natural resource industries, and for the natural resources industries excluding
energy extraction, averaged over the years 1970-1974 and 2001-2005, the average annual percentage
change in these shares and ratios over the 36 years following 1970, and the post-1970 coeﬃcients of
variation for each of these series. What is immediately striking in the summary statistics included
in Table 2 is the apparent contrast between the resource industries’ contributions to intensive
performance, and their contributions to extensive performance (included in Table 1).
Among all the resource industries, total payments to labour and capital in excess of their
opportunity costs rose from 9% of G.N.P. between 1970-1974 to over 11% of G.N.P. between 2001-
2005. This not only indicates growth in the proﬁtability of the resource industries over and above
the average growth rate of the aggregate economy, but the total value of these rents was clearly
substantial and persistent throughout the post-1970 period. It is also interesting to note that,
11although the diﬀerence was not statistically signiﬁcant, the resource industries without energy
extraction actually increased their rent shares slightly faster than the sector as a whole (with
energy extraction included): 0.63% per year relative to 0.23% per year, respectively.
For the total factor productivity, labour productivity, and capital-labour ratios the most dra-
matic illustration of the resource industries’ impact on per capita economic performance after 1970
is the presence of very high levels among all three ratios relative to the aggregate economy. Between
1970-1974 the resource industries enjoyed T.F.P. that was almost 57% higher than the aggregate
Canadian economy, and although this ratio fell slightly over the period, by 2001-2005 they were
still almost 46% more productive. The relative ratios for labour productivity and capital intensity
were even higher, with the resource industries generating over two and a half times more output per
worker than the aggregate economy between 2001-2005, and employing more than two and a half
times as much capital per worker. The resource industries’ labour productivity and capital-labour
ratios both increased faster than the aggregate economy after 1970, and like the rent shares, their
average annual rates of change were virtually identical with and without energy extraction.
If we use these proﬁtability, productivity, and capital intensity measures to assess the impact
of resource specialization on post-1970 intensive economic performance, it would be diﬃcult to
support any suggestion that resource specialization was impeding performance by drawing inputs
away from more growth enhancing sectors. Even the ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries were
persistently proﬁtable and productive, with very high capital-labour ratios, and these indicators
of intensive performance were not falling sharply after 1970. In an eﬀort to place the summary
statistics reported in Table 2 into their appropriate chronological context, we may again adopt a
longer run perspective and consider these indicators over the 1947-2005 period.
3.1 A Longer Run Perspective
In Figures 5-8 the resource rent shares, relative T.F.P. ratios, labour productivity ratios, and
capital-labour ratios for all energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries are depicted for the
years 1947-2005. These ﬁgures also illustrate the resource producers’ shares and relative ratios
with the energy extraction industries removed. Again, each series has been decomposed into its
stationary and non-stationary components using a Hoddrick-Prescott ﬁlter, and the longer run
cyclical movements are illustrated using the non-stationary, or smoothed components.
Insert Figures 5-8
12In general the conclusions we can draw from a consideration of the longer run patterns in
the resource industries’ rent shares, productivity ratios, and capital-labour ratios reinforce the
three points of interest that were discussed with respect to Figures 2-4. Speciﬁcally: there does
not appear to have been any substantive or detrimental change in the chronological evolution of
these series coincident with the post-1970 expansion of the human capital and technology intensive
new economy industries in Canada; the energy extraction industries experienced a fairly dramatic
increase in their contributions starting in the late 1960s; and; energy extraction was clearly more
volatile than ﬁshing, forestry, and mining after 1970, particularly with respect to their resource
rents and capital accumulation.
With the exception of a short lived increase in the energy extraction industries’ rent shares
during the very early 1970s, the slow decline in these shares appears to have begun during the
immediate aftermath of World War 2 and continued unabated until the late 1980s. The resource
industries’ relative T.F.P. performance has been remarkably stable since the late 1950s, and their
relative labour productivity and capital-labour ratios appear to have been rising slowly, but persis-
tently throughout the entire 1947-2005 period. Again, the early 1970s boom in energy extraction,
and subsequent bust during the early 1980s, is evident in the labour productivity ratios, capital-
labour ratios, and most obviously in the rent shares. It is interesting to note that the inclusion of
the energy extraction industries does appear to increase the level of the resource industries’ T.F.P.
performance, but energy’s boom and bust cycles are not evident in Figure 6. In fact, over the
1947-2005 period the ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries actually have slightly more volatile
T.F.P. performance than the energy extraction industries (measured by the coeﬃcient of variation).
Based on the summary statistics presented in Table 2 and the longer run chronological patterns
that may be identiﬁed in Figures 5-8, it appears that although the resource industries (particularly
the ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries) may have been getting smaller relative to the aggregate
economy after 1970, this does not necessarily imply that they were constraining aggregate per capita
economic performance. All of the resource industries appear to have been proﬁtable, productive,
and capital intensive long before and long after 1970. Of course, if we broaden our view beyond
macroeconomic growth theories, and consider resource based theories of economic development,
then proﬁtability, productivity, and capital intensity may not be the only channels through which
resource exploitation can have an impact on economic performance.
134 Indirect Contributions to Economic Performance: Spilling Over
and Crowding Out
The staples thesis is a descriptive development model based on the notion that the extraction,
processing, and export of a nation’s physical resource endowments can lead to diversiﬁcation, in-
dustrialization, and urbanization if connections between resource industries and other sectors in the
economy can be fostered.12 For example, resource extraction and processing requires both manu-
factured goods and services as inputs. Thus, resource intensive production increases the demand for
the products produced by these other industries, creating backward linkages. In addition, domestic
resource production increases the supply of raw materials available to other sectors of the economy,
as well as reducing transportation and transactions costs for these inputs. Domestic production of
raw material inputs, therefore, may reduce costs, increase proﬁts, and encourage growth through
the creation of forward linkages. Final demand linkages, on the other hand, may be formed as
a result of the consumption of goods and services, such as ﬁnancial transactions, infrastructure,
residential capital construction, or consumer goods, by the labour and capital employed by resource
producers. The presence of these three types of linkages, therefore, implies that resource exploita-
tion may do more than contribute directly to the intensive performance of an economy through the
generation of proﬁts, productivity, and capital accumulation. Resource industries may comprise a
leading sector, from which performance spills over into other sectors in the economy, resulting in
indirect and subsidiary intensive growth.
Of course, the staples thesis is not the only resource based model of economic growth and
development. Other models, including those associated with the empirical identiﬁcation of “Dutch
disease” or a “resource curse”, have adopted a much more sombre view of the role played by
resource specialization in the promotion of long run performance.13 These models suggest that the
concentration of labour and capital in resource intensive (rent seeking) industries may drive up
input costs and/or the value of the domestic currency. These price eﬀects may, in turn, harm non-
resource intensive producers by making their labour, capital, and imported intermediate inputs
more expensive, and their export products less desirable on foreign markets. The presence of
these crowding out eﬀects, therefore, implies that any positive raw material price or demand spill
12For a recent review of the literature on the staples thesis and a concise theoretical exposition of its main features
see Findlay and Lindahl (1994).
13For surveys of the theoretical and empirical Dutch disease and resource curse literature see Corden (1984) and
Auty (2001), respectively.
14overs associated with resource specialization may be at best muted and at worst swamped by
the coincident imposition of counteracting costs on the other non-resource intensive sectors in the
economy.
4.1 Leading and Lagging Sectors
We can begin our investigation of the extent to which the resource industries may have contributed
indirectly to domestic performance, in either a positive or negative way, by ﬁrst determining if
these producers comprised a leading or lagging sector in the Canadian economy after 1970. If the
resource industries were leaders, then we should expect to ﬁnd that increases in period t−i natural
resource output (NRQ) were statistically signiﬁcantly related to subsequent increases in period t
new economy output (NEQ) and rest of the economy output (ROEQ).14 This chronological pattern
in sectoral output growth can be identiﬁed using a reduced form vector autoregressive system and
Granger causality tests. All of the V.A.R. systems and Granger causality tests described in this
section have been run with and without energy extraction industries, and with and without the
public sector new economy industries - education, health, and social services.
In general, Granger causality tests seek to establish the statistical strength of the relationship
between a current (period t) dependent variable and past (period t − i) values of the independent
variables, which include past values of the dependent variable itself. Because I am interested in the
chronological relationship between changes in resource output, new economy output, and rest of
the economy output, I have estimated the parameters from a three equation vector autoregressive





















i=1γ3i∆ROEQt−i + 5t (5)
Where: ∆NRQ = log diﬀerence in the value added generated by resource industries (with and
without energy), deﬂated by industry speciﬁc price indexes; ∆NEQ = log diﬀerence in the value
added generated by new economy industries (with and without the public sector), deﬂated by sector
speciﬁc price indexes; ∆ROEQ = log diﬀerence in the value added generated by all industries
not classiﬁed as resource or new economy industries, deﬂated by sector speciﬁc price indexes;
14As illustrated in Figure 1, R.O.E. is simply total economic activity less all of the natural resource and new
economy industries.
15α,β,γ = parameters to be estimated; and;  = normally distributed i.i.d.(0,Ω) regression residuals.
Optimal lag length (n) has been chosen using both the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria.15
Stationarity in the log diﬀerences of all series has been established with at least 99% conﬁdence
using Phillips-Perron unit root tests.
If the parameter estimates associated with ∆NRQt−i (β1 in Equation (4) and γ1 in Equation
(5)) are statistically signiﬁcant and positive, then I can reject the hypothesis that past changes in
resource intensive production were statistically unrelated to current changes in the output produced
by new economy and rest of the economy industries, respectively. If I can reject these hypotheses,
then I may conclude that changes in post-1970 Canadian resource output “Granger caused” changes
in the output produced by the other two sectors. This conclusion does not necessarily imply
any economic relationship among these variables, it merely implies that, with some statistical
conﬁdence, I can claim that increases in natural resource output chronologically preceded increases
in new economy and rest of the economy output.
The parameter estimates reported in Panel A of Table 3 reveal that between 1970-2005 in-
creases in energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining production levels were associated with subsequent
(statistically signiﬁcant) increases in human capital and technology intensive production levels,
and increases in the output produced by the rest of the economy group of industries. Increases
in human capital and technology intensive production levels over this period were associated with
subsequent (statistically signiﬁcant) increases in the output produced by the rest of the economy
group of industries, but not the output produced by the resource intensive industries. These esti-
mates, therefore, are consistent with the view that Canada’s natural resource producers played a
leading role in the domestic economy after 1970, and the expansion of the new economy group of
industries, although also playing a leading role with respect to the rest of the economy, was not
associated with post-1970 contractions in the resource industries’ output shares. Given the param-
eter estimates reported in Panels B-D of Table 3 one must be very cautious in the interpretation
of this “leading sector” conclusion.
From Panel B we can see that if we remove energy extraction from the set of resource inten-
sive producers, the signiﬁcant correlation between period t new economy production and period
t − 1 resource production is lost, and the statistical connection between resource production and
rest of the economy production becomes bi-directional. It is interesting to note that this single
15In Table 3 I report the estimation results using just one lag, which is the optimal lag length chosen by the
Schwartz criteria in every case. The systems have been run with three lags with no change in the qualitative
conclusions discussed below. A complete set of econometric results is available from the author.
16Table 3: Testing for Leading Sectors
PANEL A
Dependent Independent Variables
Variables ∆NRQt−1 ∆NEQt−1 ∆ROEQt−1
∆NRQt -0.056 -0.182 0.802
(0.736) (0.718) (0.148)
∆NEQt 0.087 0.753 0.084
(0.054) (0.000) (0.581)




Variables ∆NoEngyNRQt−1 ∆NEQt−1 ∆ROEQt−1
∆NoEngyNRQt -0.111 -0.538 1.255
(0.496) (0.369) (0.058)
∆NEQt 0.014 0.748 0.105
(0.723) (0.000) (0.515)




Variables ∆NRQt−1 ∆NoPubNEQt−1 ∆ROEQt−1
∆NRQt -0.052 -0.132 0.773
(0.755) (0.779) (0.181)
∆NoPubNEQt 0.082 0.645 0.212
(0.166) (0.000) (0.329)




Variables ∆NoEngyNRQt−1 ∆NoPubNEQt−1 ∆ROEQt−1
∆NoEngyNRQt -0.093 -0.324 1.096
(0.569) (0.563) (0.111)
∆NoPubNEQt -0.008 0.653 0.216
(0.882) (0.000) (0.310)
∆ROEQt 0.086 0.321 0.366
(0.115) (0.085) (0.111)
Note: NoEngyNRQ = natural resource industries with energy extraction removed. NoPubNEQ = new economy
industries with education, health, and social services removed.
Note: N = 34 for all equations. “P-values” are provided in parentheses. Parameter estimates in bold face are
statistically signiﬁcant with at least 90% conﬁdence.
17example of bi-directionality represents the only evidence in Table 3 that the resource industries
comprised a lagging sector in the Canadian economy after 1970. In Panel D we can see that if we
remove both the energy extraction industries and the public sector new economy industries from
the exercise, we can no longer identify any chronological connection between changes in resource
intensive production and the output of any of the other sectors. In Panel C we can see that even
if we do not exclude energy from the resource sector, but we do exclude the public sector human
capital and technology intensive producers, the statistical connection linking resource production
and new economy production is again lost. Clearly, the treatment of both energy extraction and
public sector industries matters: if these industries are included, energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and min-
ing industries comprise a leading sector in the Canadian economy after 1970, but if these industries
are excluded, the statistical evidence in support of this conclusion becomes tenuous (at best).
Although the energy industries’ key role in the resource sector is again evident, we may ten-
tatively view the results reported in Table 3 in a favourable light, from the resource industries’
perspective. If, as a whole, the resource industries comprised a leading sector between 1970-2005,
or at the very least they did not comprise a lagging sector, then it seems reasonable to attempt
to further reﬁne our understanding of the connections linking the resource intensive industries to
the other sectors of the domestic economy. To be more speciﬁc, I now wish to ask: “If natural re-
source industries played a leading role in the Canadian economy after 1970, what were the channels
through which they exerted inﬂuence on the other sectors of the economy?”
4.2 Forward, Backward, and Final Demand Linkages
In the absence of a formal structural model I cannot directly test for the presence of forward,
backward, and ﬁnal demand linkages in Canada after 1970. However, the estimation of reduced form
V.A.R. systems allows me to identify chronological patterns that are at least consistent with the
operation of these linkages. More speciﬁcally, if forward linkages were operable after 1970, then we
would expect to ﬁnd that increases in resource intensive output chronologically preceded reductions
in real domestic raw material prices, and increases in non-resource intensive manufacturing output.
If backward linkages were operable, then we would expect to ﬁnd that increases in resource intensive
output preceded increases in non-resource intensive manufacturing and service sector output. If
ﬁnal demand linkages were operable, then we would again expect to ﬁnd that increases in resource
intensive output preceded increases in non-resource intensive manufacturing and service sector
output. I am, therefore, interested in the connections between period t − i resource output (NRQ
18- with and without energy extraction), and period t non-resource intensive manufacturing output
(ManuQ), service sector output (ServQ), and real domestic raw material prices (WM). This
implies the need to estimate the parameters from a four equation vector autoregressive system,









































Where: ∆WM = log diﬀerence in the domestic raw material price index relative to the G.N.P.
deﬂator (1970=1.00); ∆ManuQ = log diﬀerence in the value added generated by all non-resource
intensive manufacturing industries deﬂated by a sector speciﬁc price index; ∆ServQ = log diﬀerence
in the value added generated by all service sector industries deﬂated by a sector speciﬁc price
index; κ,δ,ω,θ = parameters to be estimated; and;  = normally distributed i.i.d.(0,Ω) regression
residuals. As with Equations (3)-(5), optimal lag length in Equations (6)-(9) has been chosen using
both the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria, and the stationarity of the data series has been
conﬁrmed using Phillips-Perron unit root tests.16
The parameter estimates associated with ∆NRQt−1 (δ1 in Equation (7), ω1 in Equation (8)
and θ1 in Equation (9)) in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that after 1970 increases in Canadian energy,
ﬁshing, forestry, and mining output “Granger caused” subsequent reductions in real domestic raw
material prices, and increases in non-resource intensive manufacturing and service sector output.
The insigniﬁcance of the parameter estimates on ∆ManuQt−1 and ∆ServQt−1 (κ3 and κ4 in Equa-
tion (6)) indicates that among the three industry groups statistical causality was uni-directional.
These parameter estimates, while not conclusive evidence of the presence of forward, backward,
and ﬁnal demand linkages, suggest that between 1970-2005 changes in resource output preceded
changes in domestic raw material prices, non-resource intensive manufacturing output, and service
sector output in a way that was consistent with the continued operation of these linkages. However,
16Both the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria identify n = 1 as the optimal lag length, and non-stationarity
can be rejected for all four dependent variables with at least 99% conﬁdence.
19Table 4: Chronological Patterns Consistent with Forward, Backward, and Final Demand Linkages
PANEL A
Dependent Independent Variables
Variables ∆NRQt−1 ∆WMt−1 ∆ManuQt−1 ∆ServQt−1
∆NRQt -0.173 0.205 0.054 0.519
(0.373) (0.313) (0.822) (0.138))
∆WMt -0.394 0.239 -0.157 0.676
(0.042) (0.238) (0.512) (0.053)
∆ManuQt 0.367 -0.253 0.221 -0.106
(0.014) (0.107) (0.235) (0.695)
∆ServQt 0.111 -0.112 0.117 0.752
(0.031) (0.039) (0.068) (0.000)
PANEL B
Dependent Independent Variables
Variables ∆NoEngyNRQt−1 ∆WMt−1 ∆ManuQt−1 ∆ServQt−1
∆NoEngyNRQt -0.113 0.108 0.135 0.530
(0.546) (0.642) (0.653) (0.225))
∆WMt -0.294 0.150 -0.209 0.736
(0.057) (0.435) (0.398) (0.041)
∆ManuQt 0.183 -0.148 0.234 -0.099
(0.143) (0.341) (0.242) (0.734)
∆ServQt -0.002 -0.066 0.099 0.794
(0.959) (0.224) (0.157) (0.000)
Note: NoEngyNRQ = natural resource industries with energy extraction removed.
Note: N = 34 for all equations. “P-values” are provided in parentheses. Parameter estimates in bold face are
statistically signiﬁcant with at least 90% conﬁdence.
20consideration of Panel B in Table 4 should again encourage caution in the interpretation of these
“linkage” conclusions.
From Panel B we can see that if we remove energy extraction, increases in resource intensive
output still led reductions in domestic raw material prices, but the statistical signiﬁcance of the
connection between resource output and non-resource intensive manufacturing and service sector
output is lost. Once again we ﬁnd that energy extraction industries played a key role in foster-
ing a strong statistical connection among the resource, manufacturing, and service sectors in the
Canadian economy between 1970-2005.
The qualitative conclusions based on the parameter estimates reported in Table 4 are robust
across a wide range of sensitivity tests. For example, if we re-estimate our four equation V.A.R.
system using only human capital and technology intensive new economy manufacturing and service
sector output, rather than all non-resource intensive manufacturing output (ManuQ) and all service
sector output (ServQ), we still ﬁnd that increases in resource output chronologically preceded
reductions in real domestic raw material prices, and increases in new economy manufacturing and
service sector output. Again, these chronological patterns cannot be identiﬁed with statistical
conﬁdence if we remove energy extraction, but they are still evident even if we consider only the
private sector new economy service industries. The inclusion of constants into Equations (6)-(9) has
no impact on our qualitative conclusions, nor does the use of a value added weighted average of only
energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining output price indexes, rather than an aggregate raw materials
price index (WM). If we include only domestically unique changes in real raw material prices,
thereby removing the eﬀects of international price volatility, statistical conﬁdence is weakened in
some cases, but our main conclusions still hold.17 Finally, if we include control variables in this
V.A.R. system to account for the possibility that it was actually coincident U.S. demand (real
G.D.P. per capita), or international resource price movements (U.S. energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and
mining output prices) that were driving the chronological patterns we identify, we still ﬁnd that
between 1970-2005 increases in resource output (including energy extraction) preceded increases in
non-resource intensive manufacturing output, increases in service sector output, and reductions in
real raw material prices.
Based on the parameter estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 and the results from sensitivity
testing, I suggest that the evidence, while still consistent with the operation of forward, backward,
17For a detailed discussion of the identiﬁcation of idiosyncratic raw material price movements see Keay (2007) Pg.
21.
21and ﬁnal demand linkages connecting Canada’s natural resource industries to other sectors in the
economy (and to domestic raw material prices) during the post-1970 period, is not unambiguous. Of
course, the ambiguity should not necessarily undermine our conﬁdence that the resource industries
as a whole maintained their position as a leading sector in the Canadian economy after 1970 by
reducing domestic raw material prices and generating demand for the output produced by non-
resource intensive manufacturing industries and service sector industries. The evidence merely
suggests that the resource industries’ indirect contributions to aggregate economic performance
were critically dependent upon the inclusion of energy extraction industries in the resource sector.
Without energy extraction there appears to be, at best, mixed statistical support for the view that
the ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries comprised a leading sector on their own, or that forward,
backward, or ﬁnal demand linkages connected these producers to other manufacturing, service, or
human capital and technology intensive sectors in the Canadian economy between 1970-2005.
4.3 Input Price Inﬂation and Currency Appreciation
So far we have only discussed the positive spill overs that may have connected Canadian resource
intensive activities to the other non-resource intensive sectors in the economy. The Dutch disease
and resource curse literature suggests that there may have been coincident and counteracting nega-
tive spill overs, or crowding out, that also connected resource producers to the other manufacturing
and service industries in Canada after 1970. A formal structural model would be required to di-
rectly test for the presence of crowding out, but once more the estimation of reduced form V.A.R.
systems facilitates the identiﬁcation of chronological patterns that could be at least consistent with
the presence of crowding out. More speciﬁcally, if there were negative spill overs imposing costs on
the non-resource intensive sectors in the Canadian economy, then we might expect to ﬁnd that after
1970 increases in domestic resource intensive production chronologically preceded increases in the
prices paid for labour and capital by the non-resource intensive manufacturing and service indus-
tries, and increases in the value of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dollar. The connections
between period t − i resource output (NRQ - with and without energy extraction), and period t
non-resource intensive labour costs (WL), a user cost for capital (WK), and the average annual
Canada-U.S. exchange rate (CUX) are the variables of interest. This implies the need to estimate










































Where: ∆WL = log diﬀerence in the non-resource intensive manufacturing hourly wage index
relative to the G.N.P. deﬂator (1970=1.00); ∆WK = log diﬀerence in a user cost for capital (com-
prised of Moody’s AAA industrial bond yields, an assumed 10% depreciation rate, and a purchase
price index for industrial machinery and equipment (1970=1.00)) relative to the G.N.P. deﬂator;
∆CUX = log diﬀerence in the average annual Canada-U.S. currency exchange rate reported by the
Bank of Canada; η,λ,ψ,ν = parameters to be estimated; and;  = normally distributed i.i.d.(0,Ω)
regression residuals. Again, optimal lag length has been chosen using both the Schwartz and Akaike
information criteria, and the stationarity of the data series has been conﬁrmed using Phillips-Perron
unit root tests.18
The interpretation of the parameter estimates reported in Table 5 is straight forward: there
is no statistical evidence of Granger causality among any of the variables. More speciﬁcally, with
statistical conﬁdence we can reject the possibility that increases in resource intensive production
in Canada after 1970 (with or without energy included in the resource sector) were correlated with
subsequent increases in non-resource intensive labour costs, capital costs, or domestic currency
values. From both Panel A and B we can see that the parameters associated with period t − 1
resource output in the labour cost and exchange rate equations (λ1 in Equation (11) and ν1 in
Equation (13)) are not only insigniﬁcant, the point estimates are actually negative. This evidence
is not consistent with the presence of negative spill overs or crowding out. This conclusion is again
robust over a wide variety of sensitivity tests including: the use of labour costs for new economy
manufacturing industries alone, rather than all non-resource intensive manufacturers; the use of
average annual labour costs in non-resource intensive manufacturing, rather than hourly labour
18Both the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria identify n = 1 as the optimal lag length, and non-stationarity
can be rejected for all four dependent variables with at least 99% conﬁdence.
23Table 5: Chronological Patterns Consistent with Input Price Inﬂation and Currency Appreciation
PANEL A
Dependent Independent Variables
Variables ∆NRQt−1 ∆WLt−1 ∆WKt−1 ∆CUXt−1
∆NRQt 0.003 0.192 -0.0001 -0.051
(0.987) (0.760) (0.999) (0.872))
∆WLt -0.012 0.487 0.009 -0.021
(0.798) (0.002) (0.741) (0.791)
∆WKt 0.128 -0.132 0.095 -0.125
(0.683) (0.902) (0.593) (0.817)
∆CUXt -0.062 -0.419 0.037 0.448
(0.498) (0.179) (0.478) (0.005)
PANEL B
Dependent Independent Variables
Variables ∆NoEngyNRQt−1 ∆WLt−1 ∆WKt−1 ∆CUXt−1
∆NoEngyNRQt -0.022 0.401 0.055 -0.115
(0.904) (0.599) (0.650) (0.760))
∆WLt -0.036 0.455 0.012 -0.016
(0.338) (0.004) (0.644) (0.832)
∆WKt 0.137 -0.030 0.098 -0.131
(0.601) (0.978) (0.574) (0.808)
∆CUXt -0.016 -0.418 0.029 0.442
(0.839) (0.195) (0.574) (0.005)
Note: NoEngyNRQ = natural resource industries with energy extraction removed.
Note: N = 34 for all equations. “P-values” are provided in parentheses. Parameter estimates in bold face are
statistically signiﬁcant with at least 90% conﬁdence.
24costs; the use of interest rates alone, or purchase price indexes alone, rather than a user cost for
capital; and; the inclusion of constants and control variables for U.S. demand and international
resource prices.
In light of the considerable body of literature on Dutch disease and resource curse eﬀects, and
much of the recent policy discussion and regional discord involving issues linked to energy pricing
and trade, the absence of any chronological patterns that are consistent with the presence of a
connection between Canadian resource output and input price inﬂation or currency appreciation
may seem surprising. Of course, we would only expect the labour and capital cost eﬀects to be
present if Canadian input markets were not well integrated across regions or with international
markets. We should also expect the currency appreciation eﬀects to be substantive only if the
Canada-U.S. exchange rate was determined by forces originating in Canada’s resource sector, rather
than other Canadian export sectors (such as the auto sector), or the U.S. economy (due to expensive
overseas military entanglements, for example).19 This suggests that the results should perhaps not
be quite so surprising, if we believe that Canadian input markets have been fairly well integrated
over the 1970-2005 period, and the forces determining the value of the Canadian dollar relative
to the U.S. dollar have not been persistently and substantially determined within the domestic
resource sector alone.
5 Conclusions
Based on the evidence described in this paper, it appears that, although they may have been
relatively large throughout the post-1970 period, Canada’s resource industries’ employment, in-
vestment, and income shares dropped quite precipitously between 1970-2005. The rapid erosion
in the extent to which the aggregate economy specialized in resource extraction and processing
activities coincided with a dramatic expansion in Canada’s human capital and technology inten-
sive industries. However, it also appears that the resource intensive producers’ input and income
shares had been gradually falling throughout much of the post-World War 2 era, and even with
their ﬂamboyant booms and busts, the energy extraction industries’ contributions to the aggregate
size of the Canadian economy increased substantially after 1970. When we look at the resource
industries’ proﬁtability, productivity, and capital intensity, we ﬁnd that throughout the post-1970
19The absence of a signiﬁcant relationship between resource output and the exchange rate over the full 1970-2005
period is consistent with Issa, Lafrance and Murray’s (2008) ﬁndings. They suggest that the relationship between
Canadian energy prices and the exchange rate switched from positive to negative during the early 1990s due to
changes in policy and trade patterns.
25period, but (perhaps surprisingly) particularly among the ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries,
their contributions to intensive economic performance were large, positive, and growing. Turning to
the resource industries’ indirect economic contributions, we ﬁnd that between 1970-2005 increases
in resource intensive production chronologically preceded increases in the output produced by new
economy industries and other non-resource intensive industries. There is no evidence to suggest
that this Granger causality was by-directional. If, as the chronological patterns among the sectors
suggest, the resource industries maintained their role as a leading sector in the domestic economy
after 1970, then the channels through which they exerted their inﬂuence may have been related to
the operation of forward, backward, and ﬁnal demand linkages. The estimation of reduced form
V.A.R. systems indicates that increases in resource industry output preceded reductions in real
domestic raw material prices, and increases in non-resource intensive manufacturing output and
service sector output. While these results from the Granger causality tests are consistent with
the continued operation of traditional staples thesis linkages, they are dependent on the inclusion
of energy extraction industries among the set of resource intensive producers. Finally, I can ﬁnd
no evidence to suggest that there was relationship between increases in the output produced by
Canada’s energy, ﬁshing, forestry, and mining industries and subsequent increases in non-resource
intensive labour or capital costs, or the value of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dollar.
What can we conclude from this evidence? Even at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century
Canada’s aggregate economy was still specialized to a considerable degree in resource production,
particularly energy production. However, the resource sector as a whole, even without energy, does
not appear to have been constraining per capita performance, and as long as we include energy, the
natural resource industries still appear to have comprised a leading sector in the domestic economy,
with positive spill overs driving down domestic raw material prices and generating demand for non-
resource intensive production. In addition, we cannot ﬁnd any evidence consistent with input price
or currency crowding out. In total, therefore, the evidence seems to suggest that since 1970 resource
specialization has been quite advantageous for the aggregate Canadian economy.
In light of this qualitative conclusion it is tempting to go one step further and argue that
policies designed to promote resource specialization into the future will have few negative side
eﬀects and many positive side eﬀects for the aggregate economy. If we wish to make this argument
based on the evidence presented in this paper we must use considerable caution. The evidence
described here is descriptive, not predictive. The success of resource specialization for Canada in
the past has been conditional on our ability to generate a steady ﬂow of resource rents, retain these
26rents within Canada, and foster linkages between resource intensive production and domestic non-
resource intensive production. In other words, the economic discovery of a series of new resource
stocks that could be proﬁtably exploited (Fort McMurray’s oil sands, Voisey’s Bay, Hibernia, for
example) has been necessary for rent generation, increasing government resource rent taxation
and encouraging domestic capital ownership has been necessary to keep rents within the country
(government’s share of total resource rents increased from 9% in 1970 to 23% in 199920), and
monetary, environmental and industrial development policies have been necessary to encourage
diversiﬁcation and the formation of linkages. If we are not able to maintain these “conditions”,
then there is no guarantee that continued resource specialization will lead to continued economic
success.
20For a more detailed illustration of the distribution of resource rents in Canada see Keay (2007) Table 3.
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32Figure 6: Long Run Relative Total Factor Productivity
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Figure 7: Long Run Relative Labour Productivity
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33Figure 8: Long Run Relative Capital/Labour Ratios
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